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The plaintiff and appellant, Chris Ann Mellor, through her undersigned counsel, submit 
this reply brief in response to the brief of appellee Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in 
Liquidation ("Wasatch Crest'' or "the Liquidator"). 
RESPONSE TO THE LIQUIDATOR'S STATEMENT OF THE COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Liquidator bases much of its argument on the existence of the Second 
Amended Notice of Determination ("SANOD") it attached as an exhibit to its Reply 
Brief in the lower court dated June 29,2010. Record at 5641-5653. See, Liquidator's 
Brief, pp. 9,12 fl[ 2), 18, 19, 21-26; However, the Liquidator attached the SANOD as an 
Exhibit to his Reply brief before the trial court purely for litigation strategy purposes. 
The SANOD was not provided within reasonable time frames after Mellor requested the 
Liquidator to decide her claim and was never properly served on either Mellor or her 
counsel. As outlined in Mellor's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Respondent and Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated March 25, 2011, pp. 2-4, 
the SANOD was provided only after the parties, through their counsel, had made efforts 
to both obtain a decision from the Liquidator concerning the priority of Mellor's claim 
and had also discussed the possibility of settling that claim. See the Affidavit of Brian S. 
King dated March 25, 2011 filed previously in this appeal, ffl[ 3-11. 
It was approximately a year after the final communications between counsel for 
the parties in the summer of 2009 and approximately six months after the filing of 
Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment in January of 2010 in this matter that the 
Liquidator provided the SANOD. The Liquidator asserts that the SANOD triggered a 60-
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day time frame within which Mellor was obligated to either object to and appeal the 
determination or be bound by the Liquidator's decision. However, even if the SANOD 
did trigger the 60-day time frame, it would end on August 29,2010, approximately two 
months before the trial court issued a ruling on Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In that Motion for Summary Judgment, Mellor requested a ruling from the trial court on 
the very issue the SANOD purported to decide: the classification of Mellor's claim. 
In its Statement of Facts, the Liquidator also states that "neither ORS nor 
Medicaid ever filed a claim on its own behalf in the liquidation proceeding." 
Liquidator's Brief, p. 11. This statement of fact is true in the sense that ORS did not 
avail itself of its right under UCA § 26-19-5(l)(a) to bring a claim directly against 
Wasatch Crest or the Liquidator to recover the medical assistance it provided to Mellor 
for Hay den Williams' medical expenses. However, UCA § 26-19 et. Seq, Utah's 
Medical Benefit Recovery Act, makes clear that ORS is not obligated to proceed directly 
against Wasatch Crest or the Liquidator in matters involving claims for reimbursement of 
Medicaid expenses. ORS may include its claim for reimbursement of monies paid to a 
Medicaid recipient in a cause of action asserted by the Medicaid recipient against a third 
party tortfeasor, or against entities such as Wasatch Crest, when those individuals or 
entities are primarily responsible for paying medical expenses that Medicaid has initially 
paid. See UCA § 26-19-7(2) and (4). In addition, state and federal law, read in 
combination, create a lien by operation of law on any proceeds arising out of a claim a 
Medicaid recipient, such as Mellor, pursues against a third party that results in 
5 
reimbursement of Medicaid funds. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, ]f8-9; 57 
P.3d 1067, 1069. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review and Preservation of Error 
The Liquidator points out that Mellor's Opening Brief was deficient for failing to 
identify "the standard of appellant review with supporting authority" with either 
"citations to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a 
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." 
Wasatch Crest Opening Brief p. 14. Mellor acknowledges the oversight in its Opening 
Brief and apologizes to the Court. 
With regard to the issue presented for review identified in Mellor's Opening Brief, 
the standard of appellate review is de novo based on the fact that the question before the 
Court regarding whether Mellor's claim has Class Three or Class Six distribution priority 
is a question of law. Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, f7, 201 P.3d 1004, 
1007. With regard to issues raised by Wasatch Crest in its Brief relating to whether the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order is a final Order appealable as a final 
judgment, this issue is likewise a question of law that is reviewed under a de novo 
standard of review. Id. Finally, with regard to Wasatch Crest's assertion that Mellor9s 
claim is barred because she failed to file a timely objection to the Second Amended 
Notice of Determination, this question is likewise a question of law that is reviewed 
under a de novo standard of review. Id. The first issue was briefed by both parties in their 
papers before the district court and was a focus of the trial court's ruling. Record, vol. 12, 
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pp. 5141-5327, vol. 13, pp. 5564-5603; 5615-5634; 5641-5653; 5702-5709. The second 
and third issues are raised for the first time on appeal and were not in existence or ripe at 
the time the parties briefed the issues before the trial court. 
II. The Trial Court's 11/1/10 Order is a Final Appealable Judgment 
As stated by this Court in its March 31,2011, Order on Wasatch Crest's Motion to 
Dismiss, the jurisdictional dispute was deferred by this Court until this plenary briefing. 
As Wasatch Crest incorporated into its Brief the arguments made in its January 21, 2011, 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Dismissal, Mellor incorporates into 
this Reply Brief her Memorandum of Points of Authorities in Opposition to Respondent 
and Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated March 25, 2011. 
The Liquidator argues that the trial court's November 1,2010, Memorandum 
Decision and Order ("the 11/1/10 Order") is not a final appealable order because it 
simply ratified the Liquidator's request that the action be stayed and did not constitute 
entry of a final decision on the merits. The face of the 11/1/10 Order indicates that 
Wasatch Crest moved the Court to deny Mellor's motion for summary judgment or stay 
the motion. 11/1/10 Order, p. 3. The trial court did both. It also analyzed the merits of 
whether Wasatch Crest was estopped from denying payment of Mellor's claims and 
discussed at some length whether Mellor had standing to pursue claims against Wasatch 
Crest. 11/1/10 Order, pp. 3-5. In addition, the trial court analyzed where Mellor's claim 
belonged in U.C.A. §31A-27-335's class framework. It basically adopted the 
Liquidator's analysis and ruled that Mellor's claim fell into Class Six rather than Class 
Three. 11/1/10 Order, pp. 6-7. The trial court disposed of all claims presented to it and 
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left nothing for the Liquidator to determine in additional administrative proceedings. 
Indeed, the Liquidator has not identified any issues it asserts remain unresolved or have 
yet to be decided based on the 11/1/10 Order. The only thing left to do in the case is 
calculate the specific amount to be paid on Mellor's claim. 
The existence of Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in January, 2010, 
eventually prodded the Liquidator to provide the SANOD. It was months late in coming 
and was not effective to fairly and properly serve notice of the Liquidator's decision to 
either Mellor or her counsel. However, the SANOD does make clear that the reasoning 
behind the Liquidator's decision to classify Mellor's claim as Class Six rather than Class 
Three was the same as the trial court's eventual analysis. Taken together, the SANOD 
and the 11/1/10 Order make unnecessary a stay and remand of the case to the Liquidator. 
There is no question about what the Liquidator's decision would be if this Court rules 
that the 11/1/10 Order was not a final appealable ruling and instead remands the matter to 
the Liquidator for additional consideration. Remanding the case to the Liquidator would 
be futile and a waste of resources and time. 
In addition, there is risk of unfairness to Mellor associated with a remand to the 
Liquidator. He has made clear his position that any claim by Mellor is barred based on 
her failure to object to the SANOD within the 60 day time frame supposedly triggered by 
the Liquidator's inclusion of the SANOD as an exhibit to the Liquidator's June 29, 2010, 
Reply brief. For the reasons outlined in her March 25, 2011, Memorandum of Points and 
Authority in Opposition to the Liquidator's Motion to Dismiss filed with this Court, 
Mellor asserts that no 60 day time frame began to run. However, remanding the matter to 
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the Liquidator for further proceedings would not simply be a futile gesture. Rather, it 
would prejudice Mellor's ability to require the Liquidator to consider the priority of her 
claim under U.C.A. §31A-27-335 on the merits. 
The Liquidator also asserts that the 11/1/10 Order states Mellor retains "the option 
of challenging the latest notice of determination" within the Liquidation proceeding. 
However, since the trial court made that statement, the Liquidator has made his position 
clear to this Court that Mellor has lost the right to challenge the Liquidator's decision to 
classify Mellor's claim as Class Six rather than Class Three. This makes more clear the 
futility and risk of prejudice to Mellor of a remand to the Liquidator for additional 
consideration of the appropriate classification of Mellor's claim. 
In its brief the Liquidator asserts it was Mellor's "impatience" that improperly 
caused her to appeal the trial court ruling. Liquidator's Brief, p. 19. This argument is 
problematic in light of the Liquidator's failure to provide a timely notice of determination 
of the priority of Mellor's claims after this Court's first decision in Mellor v. Wasatch 
Crest, 2009 UT 5. The Liquidator's assertion that"... he learned new information once 
the claim was remanded—that is, Medicaid had paid all of Hay den's medical expenses," 
Liquidator's Brief, p. 19, is implausible on its face. The Record shows that the Liquidator 
had known for years that Medicaid stepped in and paid Mellor's medical expenses for 
Hayden's treatment. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5583; 5602-5603; 5628-5634. Indeed, it was 
Wasatch Crest's knowledge of Medicaid's involvement in paying Hayden William's 
medical expenses that initially caused it to improperly terminate Hayden's coverage in 
2001. 
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III. Mellor is Not Barred From Challenging the Liquidator's Classification of 
Her Claim Based on a Failure to Timely Object to the SANOD. 
The Liquidator asserts that Mellor's failure to file an objection to the SANOD 
within 60 days after June 29, 2010 bars her ability to appeal the Liquidator's decision on 
that issue. The problem with imposing the 60-day deadline referenced in UCA § 31-A-
27-332(1) is that the Liquidator's process for considering Mellor's claim and issuing a 
timely notice of determination was fundamentally flawed. In fact, shortly after this 
Court's decision in Mellor v. Wasatch Crest, 2009 UT 5, Mellor again requested payment 
of her claims from the Liquidator. But the Liquidator did not make any sort of timely 
decision regarding the priority of her claim. Rather, as outlined in the Affidavit of Brian 
S. King dated March 25, 2011, counsel for Mellor and the Liquidator traded 
correspondence, had a face to face meeting together with the attorney for ORS, and 
exchanged several telephone calls. Mellor's counsel offered to appear and provide 
additional information to the Liquidator or the Utah Life and Health Insurance Guaranty 
Association or respond to questions about Mellor's claim. However, nothing happened. 
The claim stagnated. There were no additional communications from the Liquidator after 
July, 2009, nor did the Liquidator provide any decision on the priority of Mellor's claim. 
Consequently, Mellor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in January of 2010. Record 
at 5141-5187. 
Even the filing of Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment did not prod any timely 
decision on the priority of Mellor's claim. Rather, the Liquidator responded on April 27, 
2010, by filing a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion to Stay Claimant's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment. Record at 5564-5603. After Mellor filed her 
Consolidated Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on June 1, 2010, the Liquidator filed his 
June 29, 2010, Reply Memorandum in Support of his various motions. Only then did the 
Liquidator provide the SANOD - as an exhibit to the Reply Memorandum. There was 
nothing other than a reference to the SANOD in the Reply Memorandum to give notice to 
Mellor or her counsel of the Liquidator's position that a 60-day time frame had begun on 
June 29, 2010. The Reply Memorandum was simply part of litigation before the trial 
court that, among other things, asked the trial judge to decide the same issue the SANOD 
purported to address: what was the appropriate classification of Mellor's claim. The 
Liquidator identifies no basis for his untimely issuance of the SANOD without waiting 
for a resolution by a District Court Judge on the issue before the trial court. Mellor had no 
reason to believe that the Liquidator's issuance of the SANOD overrode or cut short the 
trial court's authority to rule on the issues the parties had briefed and placed before the 
trial court. 
The Liquidator is not just an adverse party in litigation. His powers and duties under 
the Utah insurance code are in the nature of acting as a fiduciary to all interested parties 
and stakeholders in connection with the liquidation of an insolvent insurer. U.C.A. §31A-
27-314. Mellor and other claimants against Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in 
Liquidation are entitled to treatment by a Liquidator committed to thoroughly and 
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impartially evaluate all claims presented to him. The Liquidator's action in sandbagging 
Mellor with the SANOD is inconsistent with those fiduciary obligations. 
IV. Mellor's Claim is a Class Three Claim Under the Liquidation Statute 
The language of the liquidation statute categorizes Class Three as "all claims 
under the policies for losses incurred" including the following: (A) claims with the 
federal, state or local governments; (B) third party claims " U.C.A. § 31A-27-
335(2)(c)(i)(A)-(B). The statute also excludes from Class Three claims, " . . . that portion 
of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other benefits or advantages 
recovered or recoverable by the claimant...." U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii). 
Mellor's claim was a "loss incurred" by Mellor. Hay den Williams' medical 
expenses should have been paid by Wasatch Crest but were not. Alternatively, the Utah 
State Medicaid program, funded by federal and state tax dollars, incurred a loss when it 
stepped up to the plate in lieu of Wasatch Crest, and paid Hay den Williams' medical 
expenses. In addition, the lien ORS has under its collection agreement with Mellor or by 
operation of law under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act constitutes a "third party 
claim" which Mellor has the ability to assert. 
The Liquidator argues that Medicaid's payment of Hay den Williams' medical 
providers constitutes "indemnification," as that word is used under U.C.A. §31A-27-
335(2)(c)(iii) and this converts Mellor's claim to Class Six rather than Class Three. 
However, while the entry of Medicaid onto the scene shortly after Hay den's accident in 
2001 relieved Mellor of financial obligation to Hay den's medical providers, more than 
this is required to constitute "indemnification" under this section of the insurance code. 
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The government assistance provided from state and federal funds from Medicaid 
to Mellor for Hay den William's medical expenses were not "indemnification" in the true 
sense of the word. Medicaid's payment of benefits constituted a stop-gap measure by the 
payor of last resort to prevent the financial problems that Hay den's large medical 
expenses would have created for Mellor. The express terms of the United States Code 
make clear that to the extent any third party such as Wasatch Crest is determined to be 
primarily responsible for medical expenses initially paid by Medicaid, that third party has 
an obligation to repay Medicaid. Thus, Medicaid's payment was not 'Indemnification" 
of Hay den's medical expenses because that government program contemplates being 
repaid by the party that should have been responsible for payment of those medical 
expenses in the first place. 
Cases involving the Medical Benefit Recovery Act are more commonly seen in the 
context of personal injury claims. Recipients of Medicaid benefits have their medical 
bills paid following an accidental injury and are therefore not responsible for additional 
payment to their healthcare providers. However, it is very clear in those cases that the 
recipients are in no way indemnified from an obligation to reimburse Medicaid upon 
recovery from a third party. In S.S. v. State of Utah, 972 P.2d 439 (UT 1998), 
Medicaid's right to reimbursement had priority over the creation of a special needs or 
supplemental needs trust for S.S. Id. at 444. The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
held that: 
[p]ayments made by a third party do not legally become the property 
of the recipient until after a valid settlement, which necessarily must 
include reimbursement to Medicaid. 
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Houghton, 57 P.3d at 1069, citing State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, P10, 999 P.2d 572 (UT 
2000) and Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 448 (UT 1998). 
Even if Medicaid indemnified Mellor for Hay den's medical claims, nothing in the 
insurance code prevents the indemnitor, the Utah State Medicaid program through its 
agent, ORS and Mellor in this case, from stepping up to assert a Class Three rather than 
Class Six claim under the statute. In placing Mellor's claim in the proper category, the 
priority classification framework found in U.C.A. §31A-27-335 must be read in 
combination with the Medical Benefits Recovery Act and federal statutes designed to 
protect the integrity of the federal and state monies used to fund the Utah State Medicaid 
program. Synthesizing these state and federal statutes requires that the Liquidator provide 
funds to make the taxpayer whole to the greatest extent possible rather than favor the 
interests of insurance company shareholders. 
The Liquidator argues that as of July 31, 2003 when Wasatch Crest was taken into 
liquidation, there was no policy in force on that date. Liquidator's Brief, p. 29. However 
this is sophistry. Under this Court's initial decision, the policy should have been into 
effect as of August 1, 2001 and thereafter for the entire time frame Hayden Williams was 
entitled to COBRA coverage under the Wasatch Crest policy. The only reason it was not 
in place was because Wasatch Crest improperly terminated that coverage. Mellor v. 
Wasatch Crest, 2009 UT 5,1J21. 
Next, Wasatch Crest asserts that Mellor's claim is not a governmental claim 
because it was only she, and not ORS, who filed a claim for loss under her Wasatch Crest 
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policy. Liquidator's Brief, p. 29. In this, the Liquidator is simply wrong. ORS did assert 
a claim, albeit through Mellor, as allowed under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
U.C.A. §26-19-7. 
To the extent that medical assistance is actually provided to a 
recipient, all benefits for medical services or payments from a third 
party otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are deemed to be 
assigned to [Medicaid] if [Medicaid] provides, or becomes obligated 
to provide, medical assistance. . . . 
U.C.A. §26-19-4.5(1) (emphasis added). The Liquidator provides no authority to support 
the idea that he may ignore that claim or treat ORS's lien as inferior in any way to a 
claim by any insured under the policy. 
The Liquidator argues that Mellor's claims are not claims of the federal, state or 
local government because ORS has never filed a claim as required under the Liquidation 
Act with respect to benefits paid for Hay den William's medical expenses. Liquidator 
Brief, p. 32. However, the Medical Benefits Recovery Act states that once notice is 
given to a third party, such as Wasatch Crest, of the interest that ORS has in a claim, the 
insurer must "accept the state's right of recovery and the assignment to the state of any 
right of a person to payment from a party for an item or service for which payment has 
been made under the state plan." U.C.A. §26-19-4.7(2). The Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act also makes clear that ORS has no obligation to directly file a claim against third 
parties such as Wasatch Crest for payment of unreimbursed medical expenses. Rather, 
ORS has the ability to rely on the efforts of Mellor and her counsel in pursuing third 
parties for recovery of medical expenses that constitute unreimbursed funds owed to 
ORS. 
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In short, the Medical Benefits Recovery Act acknowledges the standing Mellor 
has as an insured and also requires the Liquidator to acknowledge that ORS, standing in 
the shoes of Mellor, may assert a claim with the same authority and priority Mellor 
herself has. So long as notice of both Mellor's and ORS's interests were timely provided 
to Wasatch Crest and the Liquidator, they have no ability to treat Mellor's claim as Class 
Six rather than Class Three. Paragraphs 27 through 29 of Mellor's Statement of Facts in 
her Opening Brief make clear the requisite notice of both Mellor's and ORS's claims was 
provided to both Wasatch Crest and the Liquidator. 
The Liquidator repeatedly attempts to characterize Mellor's arguments as 
"equitable" to tie into the language of UCA § 31A-27-335(l)(d) that states that "claims 
by shareholders, policy holders or other creditors may not be permitted to circumvent 
priority classes outlined in the statue through the use of equitable remedies." However, 
this is simply an inaccurate characterization of Mellor's claims. They were and are based 
on contract, tort and statutory language. There is nothing "equitable,"as that term is used 
in UCA § 31A-27-335(l)(d), about Mellor's claims. 
DATED this j ^ d a y of August, 2011. 
Brian S. King ( 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been 
delivered via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, in both hard copy and on CD to the 
following: 
John P. Harrington 
HOLLAND & HART 
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2001 
DATED this f^day of August, 2011. 
C\LK 
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ADDENDUM 
U.C.A. §26-19-4.5(1) 
U.C.A. §26-19-4.7(2) 
U.C.A. §26-19-5(l)(a) 
U.C.A. §26-19-7 
U.C.A. §26-19-7(2) and (4) 
U.C.A.§31A-27-314 
U.C.A. §31A-27-332(l) 
U.C.A.§31A-27-335 
U.C.A.§31A-27-335(l)(d) 
U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(i) (A) and (B) 
U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(iii) 
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UTAH HEALTH CODE 26-19-5 
(9) "Provider" means a person or entity who provides 
rvices to a recipient. 
(10) "Recipient" means: 
(a) a person who has applied for or received med-
ical assistance from the state; 
(b) the guardian, conservator, or other personal 
representative of a person under Subsection (10)(a) if 
the person is a minor or an incapacitated person; or 
(c) the estate and survivors of a person under 
Subsection (10)(a) if the person is deceased. 
(11) "State plan" means the state Medicaid program as 
nacted in accordance with Title XIX, federal Social 
ecurity Act. 
(12) "Third party" includes: 
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public 
or private agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier, 
employee welfare benefit plan, health maintenance 
organization, health service organization, preferred 
provider organization, governmental program such 
as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' compensa-
tion, which may be obligated to pay all or part of the 
medical costs of injury, disease, or disability of a 
recipient, unless any of these are excluded by depart-
ment rule; and 
(b) a spouse or a parent who: 
(i) may be obligated to pay all or part of the 
medical costs of a recipient under law or by court 
or administrative order; or 
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, den-
tal, or accident and health insurance to cover 
medical expenses of a spouse or dependent child 
by court or administrative order. 
(13) "Trust" shall have the same meaning as provided 
ii Section 75-1-201. 2007 
9-3. Program establ ished by department — Pro-
mulgation of rules . 
' The department shall establish and maintain a program 
he recoupment of medical assistance. 
i The department may promulgate rules to implement 
)urposes of this chapter. 1984 
9-4. Repealed. 1984 
9-4.5. Assignment of r ights to benefits. 
) (a) To the extent tha t medical assistance is actually 
provided to a recipient, all benefits for medical services or 
payments from a third party otherwise payable to or on 
behalf of a recipient are assigned by operation of law to 
the department if the department provides, or becomes 
obligated to provide, medical assistance, regardless of 
who made application for the benefits on behalf of the 
recipient, 
(b) The assignment: 
(i) authorizes the department to submit its claim 
to the third party and authorizes payment of benefits 
directly to the department; and 
(ii) is effective for all medical assistance. 
) The department may recover the assigned benefits or 
nents in accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise 
dded by law. 
) The assignment of benefits includes medical support 
third party payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by 
court of this state or any other state or territory of the 
ted States. That assignment is not in lieu of, and does not 
3rsede or alter any other court order, decree, or judgment. 
) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is enti-
to receive medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the 
artment are a reimbursement to the department. 1998 
26-19-4.7. Health insurance entity — Duties related to 
state claims for Medicaid payment or recov-
ery. 
As a condition of doing business in the state, a health 
insurance entity shall: 
(1) with respect to a person who is eligible for, or is 
provided, medical assistance under the state plan, upon 
the request of the Department of Health, provide infor-
mation to determine: 
(a) during what period the person, or the spouse or 
dependent of the person, may be or may have been, 
covered by the health insurance entity; and 
(b) the nature of the coverage that is or was 
provided by the health insurance entity described in 
Subsection (l)(a), including the name, address, and 
identifying number of the plan; 
(2) accept the state's right of recovery and the assign-
ment to the state of any right of a person to payment from 
a party for an item or service for which payment has been 
made under the state plan; 
(3) respond to any inquiry by the Department of Health 
regarding a claim for payment for any health care item or 
service that is submitted no later than three years after 
the day on which the health care item or service is 
provided; and 
(4) not deny a claim submitted by the Department of 
Health solely on the basis of the date of submission of the 
claim, the type or format of the claim form, or failure to 
present proper documentation at the point-of-sale that is 
the basis for the claim, if: 
(a) the claim is submitted no later than three years 
after the day on which the item or service is fur-
nished; and 
(b) any action by the Department of Health to 
enforce the rights of the state with respect to the 
claim is commenced no later than six years after the 
day on which the claim is submitted. 2007 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third 
party — Lien — Notice — Action — Compro-
mise or waiver — Recipient's right to action 
protected. 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated 
to provide medical assistance to a recipient that a third 
party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover 
the medical assistance directly from that third party. 
(b) Any claim arising under Subsection (l)(a) or Section 
26-19-4.5 to recover medical assistance provided to a 
recipient is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on 
behalf of the recipient by that third party. This lien has 
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except 
claims for attorney's fees and costs authorized under 
Subsection 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii). 
(2) (a) The department shall mail or deliver written notice 
of its claim or lien to the third party at its principal place 
of business or last-known address. 
(b) The notice shall include: 
(i) the recipient's name; 
(ii) the approximate date of illness or injury, 
(hi) a general description of the type of illness or 
injury; and 
(iv) if applicable, the general location where the 
injury is alleged to have occurred. 
(3) The department may commence an action on its claim or 
lien in its own name, but that claim or lien is not enforceable 
as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the depart-
ment's claim or lien before it settles with the recipient; or 
(b) the department has evidence that the third party 
had knowledge that the department provided or was 
obligated to provide medical assistance. 
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(4) The department may: 
(a) waive a claim or lien against a third party in whole 
or in part; or 
(b) compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an 
action by a recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or 
damage not included in the department's action. 
(6) The department's claim or lien on proceeds under this 
section is not affected by the transfer of the proceeds to a trust, 
annuity, financial account, or other financial instrument. 
2006 
26-19-6. Action by department — Notice to recipient. 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after commencing an action under 
Subsection 26-19-5(3), the department shall give the 
recipient, his guardian, personal representative, trustee, 
estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written 
notice of the action by: 
(i) personal service or certified mail to the last 
known address of the person receiving the notice; or 
(ii) if no last-known address is available, by pub-
lishing a notice: 
(A) once a week for three successive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county 
where the recipient resides; and 
(B) in accordance with Section 45-1-101 for 
three weeks. 
(b) Proof of service shall be filed in the action. 
(c) The recipient may intervene in the department's 
action at any time before trial. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the 
court in which the action is commenced and advise the 
recipient of: 
(a) the right to intervene in the proceeding; 
(b) the right to obtain a private attorney; and 
(c) the department's right to recover medical assistance 
directly from the third party. 2009 
26-19-7. Notice of claim by recipient — Department 
response — Conditions for proceeding — Col-
lection agreements — Department's right to 
intervene — Department's interests protected 
— Remitting funds — Disbursements — Lia-
bility and penalty for noncompliance. 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an 
action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim 
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an 
injury, disease, or disability for which the department has 
provided or has become obligated to provide medical 
assistance, without the department's written consent as 
provided in Subsection (2)(b) or (4). 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (l)(a), consent may be 
obtained if: 
(i) a recipient who files a claim, or commences an 
action against a third party notifies the department 
in accordance with Subsection (l)(d) within ten days 
of making his claim or commencing an action; or 
(ii) an attorney, who has been retained by the 
recipient to file a claim, or commence an action 
against a third party, notifies the department in 
accordance with Subsection (l)(d) of the recipient's 
claim: 
(A) within 30 days after being retained by the 
recipient for that purpose; or 
(B) within 30 days from the date the attorney 
either knew or should have known that the 
recipient received medical assistance from the 
department. 
(c) Service of the notice of claim to the department 
shall be made by certified mail, personal service, or by 
1430 
e-mail in accordance with Rule 5 of the Utah R 1 
Procedure, to the director of the Office of Rec °f0iv^ 
vices. overy Ser-
(d) The notice of claim shall include th* r n 
information: ^ foU°wing 
(i) the name of the recipient; 
(ii) the recipient's Social Security number 
(iii) the recipient's date of birth; * 
(iv) the name of the recipient's attorney if appli 
(v) the name or names of individuals or entit* 
against whom the recipient is making the claim^f 
known; ' 
(vi) the name of the third party's insurance carrier 
if known; ' 
(vii) the date of the incident giving rise to the 
claim; and 
(viii) a short statement identifying the nature of 
the recipient's claim. 
(2) (a) Within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the claim 
required in Subsection (1), the department shall acknowl-
edge receipt of the notice of the claim to the recipient or 
the recipient's attorney and shall notify the recipient or 
the recipient's attorney in writing of the following: 
(i) if the department has a claim or lien pursuant 
to Section 26-19-5 or has become obligated to provide 
medical assistance; and 
(ii) whether the department is denying or granting 
written consent in accordance with Subsection (l)(a). 
(b) The department shall provide the recipient's attor-
ney the opportunity to enter into a collection agreement 
with the department, with the recipient's consent, unless: 
(i) the department, prior to the receipt of the notice 
of the recipient's claim pursuant to Subsection (1), 
filed a written claim with the third party, the third 
party agreed to make payment to the department 
before the date the department received notice of the 
recipient's claim, and the agreement is documented 
in the department's record; or 
(ii) there has been a failure by the recipient's 
attorney to comply with any provision of this section 
by: 
(A) failing to comply with the notice provisions 
of this section; 
(B) failing or refusing to enter into a collection 
agreement; 
(C) failing to comply with the terms of a col-
lection agreement with the department; or 
(D) failing to disburse funds owed to the state 
in accordance with this section. 
(c) (i) The collection agreement shall be: 
(A) consistent with this section and the attor-
ney's obligation to represent the recipient and 
represent the state's claim; and 
(B) state the terms under which the interests 
of the department may be represented in an 
action commenced by the recipient. 
(ii) If the recipient's attorney enters into a written 
collection agreement with the department, or in-
cludes the department's claim in the recipient's claim 
or action pursuant to Subsection (4), the department 
shall pay attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the 
department's total recovery and shall pay a propor-
tionate share of the litigation expenses directly re-
lated to the action. 
(d) The department is not required to enter into a 
collection agreement with the recipient's attorney for 
collection of personal injury protection under Subsection 
31A-22-302(2). 
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i If the department receives notice pursuant to Sub-
ion (1), and notifies the recipient and the recipient's 
rney that the department will not enter into a collec-
agreement with the recipient's attorney, the recipient 
f proceed with the recipient's claim or action against 
third party if the recipient excludes from the claim: 
(i) any medical expenses paid by the department; 
or 
(ii) any medical costs for which the department is 
obligated to provide medical assistance, 
b) When a recipient proceeds with a claim under 
bsection (3)(a), the recipient shall provide written no-
B to the third party of the exclusion of the department's 
im for expenses under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or (ii). 
f the department receives notice pursuant to Subsec-
), and does not respond within 30 days to the recipient 
recipient's attorney, the recipient or the recipient's 
(a) may proceed with the recipient's claim or action 
,
rainst the third party; 
(b) may include the state's claim in the recipient's claim 
• action; and 
(c) may not negotiate, compromise, settle, or waive the 
3partment's claim without the department's consent. 
The department has an unconditional right to intervene 
action commenced by a recipient against a third party for 
irpose of recovering medical costs for which the depart-
has provided or has become obligated to provide medical 
,ance. 
(a) If the recipient proceeds without complying with the 
•revisions of this section, the department is not bound by 
my decision, judgment, agreement, settlement, or com-
)romise rendered or made on the claim or in the action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recip-
ent or any party to which the proceeds were made 
payable all medical assistance which it has provided and 
retains its right to commence an independent action 
against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the depart-
t pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5 collected 
ctly by the recipient shall be remitted to the Bureau of 
ical Collections within the Office of Recovery Services no 
r than five business days after receipt. 
) (a) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the 
department pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5 
collected directly by the recipient's attorney must be 
remitted to the Bureau of Medical Collections within the 
Office of Recovery Services no later than 30 days after the 
funds are placed in the attorney's trust account. 
(b) The date by which the funds must be remitted to 
the department may be modified based on agreement 
between the department and the recipient's attorney. 
(c) The department's consent to another date for remit-
tance may not be unreasonably withheld. 
(d) If the funds are received by the recipient's attorney, 
no disbursements shall be made to the recipient or the 
recipient's attorney until the department's claim has been 
paid. 
19) A recipient or recipient's attorney who knowingly and 
tentionally fails to comply with this section is liable to the 
partment for: 
(a) the amount of the department's claim or lien pur-
suant to Subsection (5); 
(b) a penalty equal to 10% of the amount of the depart-
ment's claim; and 
(c) attorney's fees and litigation expenses related to 
recovering the department's claim. 2005 
26-19-8, Statute of l imitations — Survival of right of 
act ion — Insurance policy not to l imit t ime 
al lowed for recovery. 
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (6), action commenced by the 
department under this chapter against a health insur-
ance entity must be commenced within: 
(i) subject to Subsection (7), six years after the day 
on which the department submits the claim for recov-
ery or payment for the health care item or service 
upon which the action is based; or 
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment 
for medical assistance, whichever is later, 
(b) An action against any other third party, the recipi-
ent, or anyone to whom the proceeds are payable must be 
commenced within: 
(i) four years after the date of the injury or onset of 
the illness; or 
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment 
for medical assistance, whichever is later. 
(2) The death of the recipient does not abate any right of 
action established by this chapter. 
(3) (a) No insurance policy issued or renewed after June 1, 
1981, may contain any provision that limits the time in 
which the department may submit its claim to recover 
medical assistance benefits to a period of less than 24 
months from the date the provider furnishes services or 
goods to the recipient. 
(b) No insurance policy issued or renewed after April 
30, 2007, may contain any provision tha t limits the time 
in which the department may submit its claim to recover 
medical assistance benefits to a period of less than that 
described in Subsection (l)(a). 
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to Section 
26-19-13.5. 
(5) The provisions of this section supercede any other 
sections regarding the time limit in which an action must be 
commenced, including Section 75-7-509. 
(6) (a) Subsection (l)(a) extends the statute of limitations 
on a cause of action described in Subsection (l)(a) tha t 
was not time-barred on or before April 30, 2007. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not revive a cause of action 
that was time-barred on or before April 30, 2007. 
(7) An action described in Subsection (l)(a) may not be 
commenced if the claim for recovery or payment described in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i) is submitted later than three years after 
the day on which the health care item or service upon which 
the claim is based was provided. 2007 
26-19-9. Employee benefit plans. 
As allowed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1144, an employee 
benefit plan may not include any provision that has the effect 
of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for any health 
care for an individual who would otherwise be covered or 
entitled to benefits or services under the terms of the employee 
benefit plan based on the fact that the individual is eligible for 
or is provided services under the state plan. 1993 
26-19-9.5. Availability of insurance policy. 
If the third party does not pay the department's claim or lien 
within 30 days from the date the claim or lien is received, the 
third party shall: 
(1) provide a written explanation if the claim is denied; 
(2) specifically describe and request any additional 
information from the department that is necessary to 
process the claim; and 
(3) provide the department or its agent a copy of any 
relevant or applicable insurance or benefit policy. 2004 
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health care obligations of the insolvent managed care 
organization to other managed care organizations or 
other insurers, if those other managed care organiza-
tions and ether insurers are licensed or have
 a 
certificate of authority to provide the same health 
care services in this state that is held by the insolvent 
managed care organization. 
(ii) The rehabilitator or liquidator may combine 
group and individual health care obligations of t ^ e 
insolvent managed care organization in any mann§ r 
the rehabilitator or liquidator considers best to pro-
vide for continuous health care coverage for t ^ e 
maximum number of enrollees of the insolvent man-
aged care organization. 
(iii) If the terms of a proposed transfer of the sa i^ e 
combination of group and individual policy obliga_ 
tions to more than one other managed care organiz a . 
tion or insurer are otherwise equal, the rehabilitator 
or liquidator shall give preference to the transfer
 0f 
the group and individual policy obligations of ^n 
insolvent managed care organization as follows: 
(A) from one category of managed care organi-
zation to another managed care organization
 0f 
the same category, as follows: 
(I) from a limited health plan to a limited 
health plan; 
(II) from a health maintenance organisa-
tion to a health maintenance organization,; 
(III) from a preferred provider organisa-
tion to a preferred proviafer organization; 
(IV) from a fraternal benefit society to
 a 
fraternal benefit society; and 
(V) from any entity similar to any of t ^ e 
above to a category tha t is similar; 
(B) from one category of managed care organi-
zation to another managed care organization 
regardless of the category of the transferee m a n l 
aged care organization; and 
(C) from a managed care organization to
 a 
nonmanaged care provider of health care cov^ r. 
age, including insurers. 
(f) If an insolvent managed care organization has re-
quired surplus, a rehabilitator or liquidator may use t ^ e 
insolvent managed care organization's required surplus to 
continue to provide coverage for the insolvent managed 
care organization's enrollees, including paying uncovered 
expenditures. 20o8 
31A-27-312. Dissolut ion of insurer. 
The commissioner may petition for an order dissolving t^e 
corporate existence of a domestic insurer or the United S t a t e s 
branch of an alien insurer domiciled in this state at the t i i^ e 
the commissioner applies for a liquidation order. The co^rt 
shall order dissolution of the corporation upon petition by t a e 
commissioner upon or after the granting of a liquidation ord^r. 
If the dissolution has r>ot previously heeu ordered, it shah )je 
effected by operation of law upon the discharge of the liquida-
tor if the insurer is insolvent. However, dissolution may \>e 
ordered by the court upon the discharge of the liquidator if the 
insurer is under a liquidation order for some other reason # 
Notwithstanding the above, upon application by the commi s . 
sioner and following notice as prescribed by the court and
 a 
hearing, the court may sell the corporation as an entity^ 
together with any of its licenses to do business, despite % e 
entry of an order of liquidation. The sale may be made t>n 
terms and conditions the court considers appropriate. How-
ever, the order approving the sale shall provide tha t the 
proceeds of the sale shall become part of the assets of the 
liquidation estate, to be distributed in the manner set forth
 m 
Section 31A-27-335, and that the corporate entity and fts 
licenses shall thereafter be free and clear from the claims 
interests of all claimants, creditors, policyholders, and stocl 
holders of the corporation under liquidation. T j 
31A-27-313. Legislative intent concerning retention of 
jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction for rehabilitation and liquidation actions is j» 
the state courts of the insurer's state of domicile, v^g? 
possible and practical.
 19te 
31A-27-314. Powers and dut ies of t h e liquidator. 
(1) The liquidator shall report to the court, at intervals 
specified by the court, on the progress of the liquidation m 
whatever detail the court orders. Unless the court orders 
otherwise, the liquidator has the powers and responsibilities 
described in this Subsection (1). 
(a) (i) The liquidator may: 
(A) appoint a special deputy to act for th$ 
liquidator under this chapter; and 
(B) determine the special deputy's compensa, 
tion, subject to the approval of the court. 
(ii) The special deputy has all the powers of th$ 
liquidator granted by this section. 
(iii) The special deputy serves at the pleasure of 
the liquidator. 
(b) (i) The liquidator may appoint or engage: 
(A) employees and agents; 
(B) legal counsel pursuan t to Section 31A-^ 
108; 
(C) actuaries; 
(D) accountants; 
(E) appraisers; 
(F) consultants; and 
(G) other personnel necessary to assist in the! 
liquidation. 
(ii) The career service laws do not apply to t h | 
persons described in Subsection (l)(b)(i). 
(c) The liquidator may fix the compensation of persoitf 
under Subsection (l)(b), subject to the approval of t h | 
court. 
(d) (i) The liquidator may defray all reasonable d | 
penses of taking possession of, conserving, conduc|j 
ing, liquidating, disposing of, or otherwise de 
with the business and property of the insurer. 
(ii) If the property of the insurer does not conta 
sufficient cash or liquid assets to defray the : 
able costs incurred, the commissioner may adva 
the costs so incurred out of the department's appit 
priation. } 
(iii) Any amounts paid under Subsection (lXdXi| 
are expenses of administration and shall be repaid fr 
the credit of the department out of the first ava'* l 
cash of the insurer. 
(e) The liquidator may: 
(J) hold hearings; 
(ii) subpoena witnesses and compel their attefil 
dance; 
(iii) administer oaths; 
(iv) examine any person under oath; 
(v) compel any person to subscribe to that P e r s 0 1 j | 
testimony after it has been correctly reduced 
writing; and 
(vi) in connection with a proceeding under 
Subsection (l)(e), require the production of any•boos 
papers, records, or other documents tha t the uClu lC^ 
tor considers relevant to the inquiry. M 
(f) The liquidator may collect all debts and claims <W| 
and money belonging to the insurer, wherever locatett 
and for this purpose: 
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(A.) The liquidator shall make recommendations to the court 
nder Section 31A-27-336 for the allowance of an insured's 
•laim under Subsection (3) after consideration of the probable 
utcome of any pending action against the insured on which 
he claim is based, the probable damages recoverable in the 
ction and the probable costs and expenses of defense. After 
Jlowance of the claim by the court, the liquidator shall 
withhold any distributions payable on the claim, pending the 
utcome of the litigation and negotiation with the insured. 
Whenever it seems appropriate, the liquidator may reconsider 
he claim on the basis of additional information and amend 
he recommendations to the court. The insured shall be 
iforded the same notice and opportunity to be heard on all 
hanges in the recommendation as in its initial determination, 
lie court may amend its allowance as it determines is 
ppropriate. As claims against the insured are settled or 
arred, the insured shall be paid from the amount withheld 
hie same percentage distribution as was paid on other claims 
f like priority, based on the lesser of: 
(a) the amount actually recovered from the insured by 
the action or paid by the agreement, plus the reasonable 
costs and expenses of defense; and 
(b) the amount allowed on the claims by the court. 
After all claims are settled or barred, any sum remaining 
•om the amount withheld shall revert to the undistributed 
ssets of the insurer. Delay in final payment under this 
iibsection is not a reason for unreasonable delay of final 
istribution and discharge of the liquidator. 
(5) If several claims founded upon one policy are filed, 
rhether by third parties or as claims by the insured under this 
action, and the aggregate allowed amount of the claims to 
hich the same limit of liability in the policy is applicable 
tceeds that limit, each claim as allowed shall be reduced in 
le same proportion so that the total equals the policy limit, 
laims by the insured are evaluated as in Subsection (4). If 
ay insured's claim is subsequently reduced under Subsection 
I), the amount thus freed shall be apportioned ratably among 
le claims which have been reduced under this subsection. 
1985 
LA-27-332. Disputed claims. 
(1) (a) When a claim is disallowed m whole or in part by the 
liquidator, written notice of the determination and of the 
right to object shall be given promptly to the claimant or 
the claimant's attorney of record, if any, by first-class mail 
, at the addresses shown in the proof of claim. 
(b) (i) Within 60 days from the mailing of the notice 
required by Subsection (l)(a), the claimant may file 
objections with the court. 
(ii) If objections are not filed within the period 
*, provided in Subsection (l)(b)(i), the claimant may not 
further object to the determination. 
(2) (a) Whenever objections are filed with the court and the 
liquidator does not alter the liquidator's ruling, the liqui-
dator shall ask the court for a hearing as soon as practi-
cable. 
(b) If the liquidator asks for a hearing under Subsec-
tion (2)(a), the court shall issue an order setting a date as 
early as possible. 
(c) At the request of the liquidator, the court may 
establish procedures for the objections hearing. 
(d) The liquidator shall give notice of a hearing under 
this Subsection (2) by first-class mail to: 
(i) the claimant or the claimant's attorney; and 
u
 (ii) any other persons directly affected, 
fe) A hearing under this Subsection (2): 
(i) shall be heard without a jury; and 
(ii) may be heard by: 
(A) the court; or 
(B) a court-appointed referee. 
(f) A hearing under this Subsection (2) shall be limited 
to the evidence upon which the liquidator made the 
determination of the claims. 
(g) If a referee is appointed under this Subsection (2), 
the referee shall submit to the court: 
(i) findings of fact; and 
(ii) recommendations, 
(h) Consistent with Subsection 31A-27-336(2), the 
court may approve, disapprove, or modify: 
(i) the liquidator's determination of a claim; or 
(ii) a referee's recommendations on a claim. 
(3) A court order issued after a hearing and pursuant to this 
section may be appealed as a final order for purposes of Rule 
54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 2002 
31A-27-333. Surety's claims against insurer. 
Whenever a creditor whose claim against an insurer is 
secured in whole or in part by the undertaking of another 
person fails to prove and file that claim, the other person may 
do so in the creditor's name. The other person is subrogated to 
the rights of the creditor, whether the claim has been filed by 
the creditor or by the other person in the creditor's name, to 
the extent that the other person discharges the undertaking. 
In the absence of an agreement with the creditor to the 
contrary, the other person is not entitled to any distribution 
until the amount paid to the creditor on the undertaking plus 
the distributions paid on the claim from the insurer's estate to 
the creditor equals the amount of the entire claim of the 
creditor. Any excess received by the creditor shall be held in 
t rust for the other person. As used in this section, "another 
person" or "other person" does not apply to a guaranty fund or 
association. 1986 
31A-27-334. Secured claims. 
(1) An allowed claim of a creditor that is secured by a lien 
on property in which the insurer who is subject to a liquidation 
has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under Section 
31A-27-323, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of the 
creditor's interest in the insurer's interest in the property or to 
the extent of the amount subject to setoff. 
(2) The value of any security for a claim is determined 
under the supervision and control of the court: 
(a) by converting it into money according to the terms 
of the agreement under which the security was granted to 
or retained by the creditor; or 
(b) by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation 
between the creditor and the liquidator. 
(3) The net amount received under Subsection (2)(a) or the 
amount determined under Subsection (2Kb) shall be credited 
upon the secured claim, and any deficiency shall be allowed as 
an unsecured claim. If the claimant surrenders the security to 
the liquidator, the entire claim shall be allowed as if unse-
cured. 1986 
31A-27-335. Priority of d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
(1) (a) Every claim in each class of claims from the insur-
er's estate shall be paid in full or adequate funds retained 
for the payment before the members of the next class 
receive any payment 
(b) Once the funds are retained by the liquidator and 
approved by the court, the insurer's estate shall have no 
further liability to members of that class except to the 
extent of the retained funds and any other undistributed 
funds. 
(c) Subclasses may not be established within any class. 
(d) A claim by a shareholder, policyholder, or other 
creditor may not be permitted to circumvent the priority 
classes through the use of equitable remedies. 
(2) The classes and order of distribution are as described in 
Subsections (2)(a) through (i). 
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(a) Class one is the costs and expenses of administra-
tion expressly approved by the liquidator, including: 
(i) the actual and necessary costs of preserving or 
recovering the assets of the insurer; 
(ii) compensation for all authorized services ren-
dered in the supervision, rehabilitation, or liqui-
dation; 
(iii) any necessary filing fees; 
(iv) the fees and mileage payable to witnesses; and 
(v) reasonable attorney's fees and other profes-
sional services rendered in the supervision, rehabili-
tation, or liquidation. 
(b) (i) Class two is the administrative expenses of 
guaranty associations. 
(ii) For purposes of this section, 'administrative 
expenses of a guaranty association" means the rea-
sonable expenses incurred by a guaranty association: 
(A) when the expenses are not payments or 
expenses that are required to be incurred as 
direct policy benefits in fulfillment of the terms of 
the insurance contract or policy; and 
(B) that are of the type and nature that, but 
for the activities of the guaranty association, 
otherwise would have been incurred by the liqui-
dator, including: 
(I) evaluations of policy coverage; 
(II) activities involved in the adjustment 
and settlement of claims under policies, in-
cluding those of in-house or outside adjust-
ers; and 
(III) the reasonable expenses incurred in 
connection with the arrangements for ongo-
ing coverage through transfer to other insur-
ers, policy exchanges, or maintaining poli-
cies in force. 
(iii) The liquidator may in the liquidator's sole 
discretion approve as an administrative expense of a 
guaranty association any other reasonable expenses 
of the guaranty association if the liquidator finds: 
(A) the expenses are not expenses required to 
be paid or incurred as direct policy benefits by 
the terms of the policy; and 
(B) the expenses were incurred in furtherance 
of activities that provided material economic 
benefit to the estate as a whole irrespective of 
whether the activities resulted in additional ben-
efits to covered claimants. 
(iv) The court shall approve the expenses approved 
by the liquidator under Subsection (2)(b)(iii) unless 
the court finds the liquidator abused the liquidator's 
discretion in approving the expenses 
(c) (i) Class three is all claims under policies for losses 
incurred including: 
(A) claims of the federal, state, or local govern-
ment; 
(B) third party claims; 
(C) claims for unearned premiums; and 
(D) claims of a guaranty association, other 
than those included in class two, including 
claims for payment of covered claims or covered 
obligations of the insurer 
(ii) All claims under life and health insurance and 
annuity policies shall be treated as loss claims. 
(iii) That portion of any loss for which indemnifi-
cation is provided by other benefits or advantages 
recovered or recoverable by the claimant are not 
included in this class, other than benefits or advan-
tages recovered or recoverable in discharge of familial 
obligations of support, by way of succession at death, 
as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities. / 
payment made by an employer to the employer^ 
employee may not be treated as a gratuity. 
(iv) Notwithstanding Subsections (2)(c)(i), (ii), an( 
(iii), the following claims shall be excluded from clasj 
three priority: 
(A) obligations of the insolvent insurer arising 
out of reinsurance contracts; 
(B) obligations incurred after: 
(I) the expiration date of the insurant 
policy; 
(II) the policy has been replaced by th< 
insured; 
(III) the policy has been canceled at th< 
insured's request; or 
(IV) the policy has been canceled as pro 
vided in the chapter; 
(C) obligations to insurers, insurance pools, oi 
underwriting associations and their claims foi 
contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equita 
ble or otherwise; 
(D) any claim that is in excess of any applica 
ble limits provided in the insurance policy issuet 
by the insolvent insurer; 
(E) any amount accrued as punitive or exem 
plary damages unless expressly covered unde 
the terms of the policy; and 
(F) tort claims of any kind against the insurei 
and claims against the insurer for bad faith o 
wrongful settlement practices. 
(v) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(c)(iv)(B), un 
earned premium claims on policies, other than rein 
surance agreements, may not be excluded. 
(d) Class four is claims of the federal government othe 
than those claims included under class three. 
(e) (i) Class five is debts due employees for services 
benefits, contractual or otherwise due, arising outc 
reasonable compensation to employees for service 
performed: 
(A) to the extent that they: 
(I) do not exceed two months of monetar 
compensation; and 
(II) represent payment for services pei 
formed within six months before the filing c 
the petition for liquidation; or 
(B) if rehabilitation preceded liquidatioi 
within one year before the filing of the petitio 
for rehabilitation. 
(ii) Principal officers and directors are not entitle 
to the benefit of class five priority except as otherwis 
approved by the liquidator and the court. 
(iii) Class five priority shall be in lieu of any oth^  
similar priority that may be authorized by law as 1 
wages or compensation of employees. 
(f) (i) Class six is claims of: 
(A) any person, including claims of state ( 
local governments, except those specifically cla 
sified elsewhere in this section, or 
(B) attorneys for fees and expenses owed thei 
by a person for services rendered in opposing) 
formal delinquency proceeding. 
(ii) To prove the claim for attorneys' fees at 
expenses, the claimant shall show that* 
(A) the insurer that is the subject of the deli 
quency proceeding incurred the fees and e 
penses based on its best knowledge, informatio 
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry inC 
eating opposition was-
(I) in the best interests of the person; 
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(II) well grounded in fact, and 
(III) warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law, and 
(B) opposition was not pursued for any im-
proper purpose, such as to* 
(I) harass; 
(II) cause unnecessary delay; or 
(III) cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. 
(g) (i) Class seven is claims of any state or local gov-
ernment for a penalty or forfeiture, but only to the 
extent of the pecuniary loss sustained from the act, 
transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or 
forfeiture arose, including the reasonable and actual 
costs incurred from the act, transaction, or proceed-
ing. 
(ii) The remainder of the claims shall be postponed 
to class eight claims, 
(h) Class eight is: 
(i) surplus or contribution notes or similar obliga-
tions; 
(ii) premium refunds on assessable policies; 
(iii) interest on claims of classes one through 
seven; and 
(iv) any other claims specifically subordinated to 
this class, 
(i) Class nine is claims of shareholders or other owners, 
including policyholders of a mutual insurance corporation 
within the limits of Subsection 31A-27-337(4)(b) except as 
they may be qualified in class three or four. 
(3) (a) If the liquidator determines that the assets of the 
estate will be sufficient to pay all class one claims in full, 
class two claims shall be paid currently, only after the 
liquidator secures from each of the guaranty associations 
receiving disbursements under this section an agreement 
to return to the liquidator the disbursements, together 
v with investment income actually earned on the disburse-
ments, as may be required to pay class one claims. 
(b) A guaranty association entering into an agreement 
under Subsection (3)(a) may not be required to post a 
, bond. 
^4) As to a nonprofit corporation organized and operating 
under Chapter 7 with assets not fully liquidated under Sub-
sections (1) and (2), the remaining assets shall be distributed 
fitter Subsections 16-6a-1405(l)(b) and (c) and Subsection 
16-6a-1405(2). 
voji (a) If any claimant of this state, another state, or 
foreign country is entitled to or receives a distribution 
upon the claimant's claim out of a statutory deposit or the 
proceeds of any bond or other asset located in another 
sh l? £r ^ o r e ^ c o u n try, unless the deposit or proceeds 
t h i - e b e e n d e l i v e r e d t o t n e domiciliary liquidator, 
/ e ^ imant is not entitled to any further distribution 
the* l i c*u i d a t o r until and unless all other claimants of 
act S a m e c*ass ' Respective of residence or place of the 
j j * or contracts upon which their claims are based, shall 
(h) rAle ived a n e < l u a l distribution upon their claims. 
\Q) After the equalization under Subsection (5)(a), the 
t^fatfE*1^ o f t h e s a m e c l a s s a r e entitled to share in the 
LaD oft t r i b u t i o n s °y t h e liquidator, along with and like 
anfo 6r. ?"edftors °f the same class, wherever the claim-
«u«s reside. 
^UppivtK16 d e c l a r a t i ° n of a distribution, the liquidator 
^ s owed fam0Unt ° f t h e d l s t r i b u t l o n against any mdebt-
l&ution Ti? t h e l n s u r e r by the person entitled to the 
llNrged b Sha11 b e n o c l a i m a l l o w e d for a n d d e d u c t" 
wWfiinn+- ^ a ^ U a r a n t y association or entity performing a 
r u u c t l o n . 
(7) This section applies retrospectively to any proceeding 
under this chapter initiated after January 1, 1992 2000 
31A-27-335.5. Health maintenance organization 
claims. 
In the liquidation of a health maintenance organization, 
claims for uncovered expenditures have priority over the third 
class of claims as provided for in Section 31A-27-335 All other 
claims shall follow the priority of distribution outlined m 
Section 31A-27-335 1995 
31A-27-336. Liquidator's recommendations to the 
court. 
(1) The liquidator shall review all claims duly filed in the 
liquidation and shall make any further investigation as he 
considers necessary. He may compound, compromise, or in any 
other manner negotiate the amount for which claims will be 
recommended to the court, except where the liquidator is 
required by law to accept claims as settled by another person, 
including a guaranty fund or association. Unresolved disputes 
shall be determined under Section 31A-27-332. As soon as 
practicable, the liquidator shall present to the court the 
reports of claims against the insurer with the liquidator's 
recommendations. The liquidator shall notify claimants of 
these recommendations. The report shall include the name 
and address of each claimant, the particulars of the claim, and 
the amount of the claim finally recommended, if any. If the 
insurer has issued annuities or life insurance policies, the 
liquidator shall report the persons to whom, according to the 
records of the insurer, amounts are owed as cash surrender 
values or other investment values and the amounts owed. If 
the insurer has issued policies on the advance premium plan, 
the liquidator shall report the persons to whom, according to 
the records of the insurer, unearned premiums are owed and 
the amounts that are owed. 
(2) The court may approve, disapprove, or modify the report 
on claims by the liquidator, except that the liquidator's agree-
ments with other parties are final and binding on the court on 
claims of any size which are settled by a payment of $1,500 or 
less. No claim under a policy of insurance may be allowed for 
an amount in excess of the applicable policy limits. 1985 
31A-27-337. D i s t r i b u t i o n of a s se t s . 
(1) (a) Subject to any instructions the court may give, the 
liquidator shall make distributions in a manner that will 
assure the proper recognition of priorities and a reason-
able balance between the expeditious completion of the 
liquidation and the protection of unliquidated and unde-
termined claims, including third party claims. 
(b) Distribution of assets in kind may be made at 
valuations set by agreement between the liquidator and 
the creditor and approved by the court in advance of the 
distribution. 
(2) (a) The liquidator shall make distributions to guaranty 
funds and associations under Subsection (1) to satisfy 
their claims under Chapter 28, Guaranty Associations, or 
similar laws of other states, if the claims have been filed 
pursuant to rules established under Subsections 31A-27-
328(1) and (4). 
(b) The total distributions to guaranty funds and asso-
ciations paid under this Subsection (2) may not exceed the 
total of the claims properly made by the funds and 
associations under Subsections 31A-27-328U) and (4). 
(c) The liquidator shall pay distributions as frequently 
as is practicable and in sums as large as possible without 
sacrificing asset values by untimely disposition or inequi-
table allocation of available assets 
(d) The liquidator may protect against inequitable al-
locations by making payments to funds and associations 
subject to binding agreements by the funds or associa-
